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We are completing the most revolutionary century in the 
history of medicine. As we look to the next century-in fact, 
to the next millennium-there is no reason to believe that 
medical progress will not continue in even more dramatic 
fashion. Yet constraints will remain, which must be ac-
knowledged in framing ethical judgments because they de-
fine the human condition. In particular, there are circum-
stances that will make concerns regarding the use of 
resources the central issue in medical ethics: 1) medical 
technologic advances will likely continue to produce new, 
promising and expensive therapeutic and diagnostic inter-
ventions; 2) human life will continue to have a limited 
duration; 3) treatment will often be only partially successful, 
leaving some individuals with a quality of life they find 
unacceptable; 4) resources for health care will be limited; 
and 5) the moral authority of states to constrain how persons 
use their resources will remain limited as well. Despite often 
Promethean expectations, we are left with the constraints of 
finitude, which include the problem of rising demands on 
medicine in the face of limited resources. 
The Failures of Ethics and Implications for 
Medical Ethics 
These are the substance of ethical concerns, not just 
economic problems. In the future as in the past, medicine 
will need to place its activities and self-understanding within 
a moral context. Physicians will need to face the restructur-
ing of American medicine to provide health insurance for all. 
The literature is already rich with new proposals (1,2). What 
is important is how we understand this step morally. 
I will first address the failures of ethics and their impli-
cations for medical ethics. For primarily moral reasons, we 
should abandon the rhetoric of providing the best care 
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equally for all and seek instead to define a basic adequate 
package that can be provided to all Americans. At first, it 
may seem immoral to speak against the rhetoric of equality 
of care and optimal care for all. Yet, insofar as men and 
women are free and have title to their private resources and 
services, the pursuit of such an egalitarian ideal presupposes 
a degree of governmental authority that falls beyond the 
scope of a limited democracy. This was the conclusion of the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 
1983 report (3), "Securing Access to Health Care," in which 
equality as a basis for equity in health care was rejected in 
favor of providing an adequate level of health care. To put 
the matter in concrete terms, a two-tiered system of health 
care, as endorsed by the recent Oregon plan (4), is morally 
acceptable and an all-encompassing system that excludes a 
private tier, as in Canada (5), is not. 
As a learned profession, medicine has a special moral role 
in making clear the limitations of technology, resources and 
the human condition. It also has the obligation to frame a 
medical ethics that accords with the basic rights of individ-
uals. If we are to articulate a morally realistic plan for health 
care allocations, it will only be with the contributions of 
physicians who can provide an understanding of those 
limitations and the clinical significance of their moral impli-
cations. 
The Finitude of Philosophy: Medical Ethical 
Variations on a Postmodern Theme 
It is not just that economics is framed within conditions of 
moderate scarcity. Ethical reflections are bound by analo-
gous scarcities. Our moral reasoning, and consequently our 
moral authority, is limited. After 2,500 years of philosophic 
reflection, there has been no success in establishing a 
canonic, content-full, general secular moral vision. This is 
the so-called postmodern insight of contemporary philoso-
phy. There is no universal content-full moral narrative or 
account (6). One cannot simply talk about justice without 
specifying to which justice one makes reference, and this 
will beg the question on matters of substantial disagreement 
(7). 
Secular philosophic reflection has not succeeded in sup-
plying a content-full surrogate for that provided by religious 
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or traditional moralities. One cannot identify the correct 
moral intuitions or correct moral sense that one should affirm 
secularly without already having moral criteria on the basis 
of which to choose among competing moral senses, moral 
intuitions, thin theories of the good or morally useful 
characterizations of disinterested observers or hypothetic 
decision-makers. One cannot determine the moral conse-
quences of different moral or public policy approaches 
without already knowing how to rank such important moral 
and social desiderata as liberty, equality, prosperity and 
security. One must first know how to weigh and compare 
liberty, equality, prosperity and security consequences. 
Free and informed consents: limited democracies and the 
free market. Because one cannot complete this impossible 
task, free and informed consent has become the central 
bioethical expedient. If one cannot discover what physicians 
and patients should do together, one asks them to agree 
about what they will do together. Similarly, the free market 
functions across the world, binding men and women together 
who are otherwise separated by radically different moral and 
religious visions. In the market their moral differences do not 
matter, for market transactions do not presuppose any 
God-given or reason-justified notion of a fair price. The 
authoritative price is established not by rational argument 
but by free agreement. The minimal morality the market 
requires is that of mutual forbearance, which includes ful-
filling contracts and eschewing fraud. One can only speak of 
the market as "rationing" or "allocating" goods or services. 
The patterns that the market produces are the summation of 
the outcomes of the decisions of persons who ration or 
allocate for themselves. Nor does the market gain its moral 
authority or standing from what it does, no matter how well 
it does it. Its authority or standing is derived from the free 
choice of those who participate. 
The same is true with respect to limited democracies. 
Limited democracies do not derive their moral authority 
from some divine authority of majorities. They have the 
authority we can plausibly conclude we have delegated to 
them, but no more. It is simply not credible that citizens 
have delegated encompassing authority over themselves, 
their goods and services. For this reason democracies are 
morally limited and can encompass citizens with divergent 
moral, political and ideologic views. In short, the moral 
practices that succeed best in a secular pluralist society are 
not those that presuppose that one can discover a content-
full view of what is right to do or find some metaphysical 
foundation for secular morality. Instead, they depend on 
human beings who create limited moral projects in which 
moral authority is derived straightforwardly from the con-
sent of the participants (8). The accent is not on content but 
on the process of free collaboration. 
Procedures such as free and informed consent and the 
free market are cardinal because of the failure of philosoph-
ical reflection to provide content for morality, or for that 
matter for bioethics. For this reason as well, limited democ-
racies are the only plausible institutions for secular pluralist 
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societies. If an independent moral authority cannot be dis-
covered, authority for common action must be derived from 
the consent of the governed, recognizing that such authority 
will always be limited. Because the consent to be governed 
cannot plausibly be understood as other than limited, there 
will always remain by default strong moral justifications for 
both rights to privacy and private property. Fundamental 
personal rights exist as a function of the limited moral 
authority of democracies. The more one is skeptical of any 
government having all-encompassing authority over per-
sonal energies, abilities and choices, the more important are 
personal freedoms. Because of the limits of moral reasoning, 
and therefore because of the limits of the justifiable moral 
authority of society, it will be impossible to establish with 
any credibility all-encompassing secular moral institutions, 
including all-encompassing health care institutions (9). 
Implications for medicine and health care policy. What are 
the implications for medicine of such moral finitude? What 
are the implications for the creation of health care policy and 
a medical ethics to guide it? 
The first and most disturbing implication is that the 
language of rights to health care and of justice in health care 
is, at the very least, useless, if not confusing. It will not be 
possible to appeal to concrete moral visions to establish an 
all-embracing just system of health care because there are 
numerous competing visions of justice and we do not know 
how to choose correctly among them. There are as many 
theories of justice and as many theories of rights to health 
care as there are major religions in the United States. The 
debate suffers from what might be termed "justice pollu-
tion" or "rights pollution"-the confounding of a debate by 
the introduction of unclear and un securable claims about 
justice and rights. In creating secular health care policy, 
secular moral discourse will need to be directed to limited 
projects of benevolence and solidarity, to the democratic 
creation of a health care policy that takes the limitations of 
resources and moral authority seriously. One does best by 
trying to do something rather than everything. 
The Problem: Accepting Finitude in the Face 
of Unbounded Expectations 
The reasons why the economics of medicine and the 
ethics of allocation will take center stage as we enter the next 
century are clear. In 1989, 11.6% of the American gross 
national product was deployed for health care (10). The 
Health Care Financing Administration estimates that by the 
year 2000 the proportion will rise to at least 15% (11). At that 
point nearly $1 of every $6 will be invested in health care. 
These increases will be driven by, among other things, the 
aging of America, increases in service intensity (12) and the 
availability of new medical technologies (13). These in-
creases might indeed be acceptable if they were likely to 
purchase commensurate improvements in health care out-
come. However, there does not appear to be any simple 
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connection between the level of health care expenditure and 
life expectancy. For example, in 1989 the United States 
invested approximately $2,354 per person in health care 
compared with $1,035 invested by Japan and $371 by Greece 
(14). However, Japanese men and women had a longer life 
expectancy and Greek men had a comparable life expect-
ancy in comparison with Americans (15). Moreover, Japan 
provides all of its citizens with an all-encompassing modern 
health care system. 
All-encompassing health care does not ensure equality in 
health outcome. In Canada, for instance, significant differ-
ences in life expectancy persist between the poor and the 
rich. The difference in life expectancy for highest versus 
lowest earners in 1986 in Canada was 5.6 years for men and 
1.9 years for women (16). This is the case even though all 
Canadian provinces have provided both universal hospital 
insurance and universal medical insurance for a decade and 
a half. There are complex forces that determine these 
differences and surely the data by themselves do not estab-
lish that something is seriously wrong with the American 
health care system or that American health care dollars are 
grossly misspent. The point is that we live in a highly 
technologic society. Consequently, we produce health care 
technologies that are inviting and promising but we must 
learn to decide prudently which to purchase and under what 
circumstances. 
Future options. As we look to the future, the options 
among which we can choose can be reduced to three. First, 
we can continue to be committed to the rhetoric of providing 
optimal care to all equally and try as best we can to realize 
this goal. The logic of such rhetoric, if it were taken seriously 
and made the basis of actual public policy, would involve a 
commitment to providing not only clearly useful diagnostic 
and therapeutic interventions, but also those that are mar-
ginally promising. If one excludes access to marginally 
useful diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, one takes a 
first step toward a different policy. Although it might be 
feasible for the short run to pursue a public policy of optimal 
care for all, as our expenditures for health care approach or 
indeed quickly exceed 15% of the gross national product, we 
will be constrained to make a choice between the two 
remaining options. 
When we decide that we will no longer pursue the 
rhetoric of optimal care for all, we will need either 1) to 
define and provide a limited package for all, and for practical 
purposes forbid the existence of a second tier of health care 
(the second option), or 2) to define and provide a basic 
package that will be guaranteed to all citizens but allow those 
who can and wish to buy diagnostic and therapeutic inter-
ventions not included in the basic package (the third option). 
If we choose the second option, we will in our hierarchy 
of values be choosing equality over liberty. In addition, we 
will be defining a basic package for all citizens, which, 
insofar as it is driven by the goal of providing as much benefit 
as possible within fiscal constraints, will be dependent on 
cost-effectiveness analyses. In selecting those diagnostic and 
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therapeutic interventions for inclusion which are demon-
strated to make a contribution to the amelioration of mor-
bidity and mortality, marginally useful diagnostic and ther-
apeutic interventions will be excluded. Or, if they are not 
excluded outright, their access would be limited through 
creating waiting lists, thus indirectly defining a basic pack-
age. Choosing this option involves a commitment to curtail-
ing the freedom of citizens to purchase additional health care 
services through private insurance or direct payments with 
the funds they have available after paying their taxes to 
support a basic health care package. Such a policy would 
involve ambitious and unsustainable secular moral presup-
positions-namely, that one knows that equality should be 
ranked higher than liberty and that the state has the moral 
authority coercively to enforce this ranking of values. Fi-
nally, one would lose a source of social criticism that can 
lead to reform of the basic system. Here one need only 
consider how the U. S. Government Post Office has bene-
fited from the existence of private express mail services, 
which offer a model of courteous and prompt service. A 
similar phenomenon appears to be provided by private 
health care in the face of an all-encompassing state system 
(17). 
The remaining option is predicated on a realization that 
societies such as ours are driven by a number of value 
systems and that in a limited democracy no particular moral 
vision should be imposed coercively on peaceable citizens. 
If one chooses to define a basic adequate package of health 
care and guarantees it to all while allowing others to buy 
lUXUry care, one draws a line traditional in most limited 
democracies. One determines a basic level of safety or 
service and ensures that, where necessary, it will be pro-
vided. But one allows those who wish and can to purchase 
more. This approach can be understood under the metaphor, 
as Welch (18) suggests, of deciding to provide standby, 
coach or first-class health care entitlements. It is one thing to 
make an argument that it is good for society, from communal 
funds, to provide all its citizens through social insurance the 
equivalent of coach care, so that none need be exposed to 
standby status for basic medical services. It is another 
matter to argue that one should provide first class for all or 
that one should forbid the provision of first-class service for 
those who wish to pay for it with private funds. There are 
grounds for commitment to a basic package of adequate 
health care that will ensure a broad equality of opportunity 
by providing general access to the wide range of diagnostic 
and therapeutic interventions found to have a significant 
yield at moderate cost. But it is another matter to claim that 
society has the moral right to allocate all resources and 
services and thus coercively intervene to forbid the peace-
able purchase of additional goods and services. 
Two·tiered health care system. The existence of a second 
tier of health care is the expression of a basic liberty of 
association and of private, peaceable action. In recognizing 
the moral inevitability of a multitiered health care system, 
one accepts the conclusion that a second tier is inevitable in 
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the absence of a moral fanaticism that would deny an area 
for private medical enterprise. The moderate view leading to 
the moral inevitability of a two-tiered system rests on the 
compromise position that goods and resources are neither 
fully communal nor fully private but a bit of both. One 
recognizes a limited commitment to public beneficence 
through a basic system of social welfare. But one recognizes 
as well the diversity of human values. the existence of 
private property. the ineradicable role of freedom and indi-
vidual choice and, therefore, the likelihood that a robust, 
private, luxury tier will also exist. A commitment to a 
two-tiered health care system that includes a basic package 
of health care guaranteed for all satisfies concerns for 
beneficence while still respecting fundamental human rights. 
To attempt coercively to achieve for a secular pluralist 
society a particular vision of the good, even an egalitarian 
vision, is, at the very least. a sin of moral hubris. 
Teaching About Finitude: Imparting the 
Virtue of Sophrosyne 
The recognition of limitations and their implications for 
medicine and the ethics of medicine is a recurring theme in 
the history of the profession. In its Hippocratic beginnings. 
medicine not only turned to patients in care and dedication. 
but also reminded physicians about the conditions of human 
finitude. Hippocratic medicine enjoined practitioners not to 
save life at all costs (19). The Hippocratic work, "The Art," 
exhorts physicians to "refuse to treat those who are over-
mastered by their diseases. realizing that in such cases 
medicine is powerless" (20). The modern era. after the 
Renaissance and the medical advances it promised, under-
scored again both the role of medicine in public policy (21) 
and the need to draw a line between basic and luxury care. 
a distinction that at the time was articulated in the concepts 
of ordinary versus extraordinary care (22). There was a 
recognition within the Judeo-Christian tradition of a Greek 
pagan insight that there was danger in attempting to save life 
at all costs and that this danger was more than fiscal. In "The 
Republic," Plato (23) had already warned that the attempt to 
save life at all costs with little probability of success or with 
only a limited quality of life would not only bankrupt the 
state, but also distort moral values. As moral theologians 
considered the use of heroic medical treatments in the 16th 
and 17th centuries, they implicitly realized that the attempt 
to save life at all costs would render this project an object of 
human idolatry and subordinate moral values to the mere 
prolongation of human existence (24). In the distinction 
between ordinary and extraordinary treatment, which they 
fashioned, they translated the Greek pagan recognition of 
human finitude and of a sense of balance, temperance or 
sophrosyne into the terms of modern European thought. 
Setting priorities. Something similar must be done for 
contemporary societies to make prudent use of high cost 
medical technologies, as well as everyday health care. Both 
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highly developed and developing societies must decide how 
much of what health care costs they will pay from communal 
resources. Health outcome studies and cost efficiency anal-
yses will be helpful only up to a point. Their usefulness will 
be limited by the emergence of new technologies and 
changes in medical practice. In addition, there is no way to 
discover how one should choose between those medical 
interventions that forestall death and those that abate mor-
bidity. There is no way to discover whether it is more 
important to establish social insurance to provide good 
dentures or treatment for leukemia. A social process of 
priority setting is needed to decide democratically what 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions will be part of the 
basic health care package guaranteed to all. Such a process 
of priority setting should be informed, as far as possible, by 
reliable health outcome studies and cost efficiency analyses. 
Moreover, if medical practice guidelines are to be a part of 
such policies, they must be realistic and relevant to the 
actual clinical context (25,26). Finally. physicians must 
remind the public that all of life is a gamble. that medicine is 
a part of life and that one can never purchase full certainty, 
safety or protection from disease, disability or inevitable 
death. In the face of uncertainty and limited resources, it will 
not be financially or morally possible to do all that one would 
like. 
Role of the physician. There is a central role that physi-
cians can play in helping the public to understand how to 
come to terms with the finitude of life, medical capacities, 
economic resources and moral authority as these limitations 
express themselves in the development of health care policy. 
Medicine must frame a medical ethic that takes finitude 
seriously and that can guide us through the tensions that will 
be engendered by ever new, promising and expensive med-
ical interventions but always limited resources. As in Hip-
pocratic times, medicine must acknowledge and underscore 
the conditions and limitations of the human condition. 
As one of the three learned professions, medicine has 
more to teach than simply medical data. It has more to 
provide than cost-effectiveness analyses. Unlike most citi-
zens, physicians see many individuals who are sick, many 
who are suffering, many who die. Physicians know well the 
uncertainties of life and death and that no exit from them can 
be purchased. Therefore, physicians have a wisdom learned 
in the face of hu~an finitude. It is this wisdom that physi-
cians will need to bring to the health care policy debates of 
the next decade. This is a major cultural undertaking. A 
medical ethics for the next century should be one that speaks 
out of beneficence and temperance (sophrosyne, if you will) 
to our human dilemma-that our hopes are those of gods and 
goddesses but our capacities those of finite men and women. 
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